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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellants in 1976 borrowed $108,000 from
respondent to purchase an apartment complex.

In order to

obtain the loan, appellants agreed that if they sold any
interest in this investment property either the loan balance
would become immediately due and payable or the new buyers
would assume the loan at a higher rate of interest.

In 1979,

however, appellants secretively sold the property and deliberately tried to conceal the sale from respondent.

In 1980,

after respondent discovered the sale, appellants failed to
pay the loan balance or to have the new buyers assume the
loan.

Appellants filed the present action to attempt to pre-

vent foreclosure.

The lower court granted summary judgment

in favor of respondent, concluding that "the 'due-on-sale'
clause before the court is not an unreasonable restraint on
alienation within the meaning of Utah law," and that it is "a
legal, valid, and enforceable contract provision."
Appellants have appealed that decision to this Court.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
On November 18,

1976, Stanley and Sheila Redd,

sterling and Jill Redd, and Paul and Donna Dutson (hereinafter referred to as "appellants") borrowed $108,000 from
respondent Western Savings & Loan Company (Western Savings)
(R. 22) to purchase a twenty-four ( 24) unit apartment comple
as an investment.

(R.

11 O.)

In connection with the financ-

ing of this investment property, appellants executed a Trust
Deed, a Trust Deed Note and a separate document entitled
"Acknowledgment of Trust Deed Acceleration Clauses."
22-25, 31, 33, 110.)

(R.

The relevant portions of these instru-

ments are set out below.
Paragraph 29 of the Trust Deed
so-called "due-on-sale" provision,

(R.

25),the

required the appellants

notify Western Savings if they transferred the property,
whether by contract or otherwise, and the provision gave
Western Savings the election to accelerate the note or
increase the interest rate of the note:
29.
[Appellants agree] to notify [Western
Savings] in writing should said property or any
interest therein be conveyed, transferred or
assigned, whether by deed, contract of sale, . .
or otherwise, • • . .
Should said property or any
interest therein be so conveyed, . . • all indebtedness secured hereby shall forthwith, without
notice, become due and payable at the election of
[Western Savings] . . . and should [Western
Savings] not so elect and the person who acquires
said property or any interest therein assumes the
indebtedness evidenced by the note secured hereby,
[appellants consent]
. to the reduction or
increase of the interest rate thereof.
(Emphasis
added.)
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t

The Trust Deed Note (R. 33) provided that if
any of the terms of the Trust Deed were violated, including
failure to notify Western Savings of any transfer of the
property as required by Paragraph 29, supra, the principal
balance of the note could be accelerated:
If default occurs in the payment of said
installments of principal and interest or any part
thereof, or in the performance of any agreement
contained in the Trust Deed securing this note, the
holder hereof, at its option and without notice or
demand, ~ay declare the entire principal balance and
accrued interest due and payable.
(Emphasis added.)
The appellants' attention was directed specifically to Paragraph 29 of the Trust Deed and they understood
the consequences of violating its terms, as evidenced by
their endorsement of the "Acknowledgment of Trust Deed
Acceleration Clauses,"

(R. 31) which provided:

In connection with the making of this Trust Deed
loan, we, the undersigned borrowers, acknowledge
that our attention has been called to paragraphs 29
and 30 of the Trust Deed, which can result in
acceleration of this note in the event of any of
the occurrences as set forth in those paragraphs.
Although appellants recognized and understood
the terms of the financing documents at issue in this case,
they nevertheless deliberately breached their obligations
under those documents.

On or about September 25, 1979, in

direct violation of the Trust Deed, they sold their interest
in their investment property by contract sale without informing Western Savings of that transfer.

(R. 3, 111.)

It was

only when Western Savings determined that the monthly Trust
Note payments were being made by Escrow Services, Inc.,
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(Escrow Services) that Western Savings investigated and
discovered that the property had been transferred.

To date,

Escrow Services has continued to proffer monthly payments
which Western Savings has refused to accept so as not to
a waiver of its contractual rights.

( R. 38, 40,

wo~

111.)

After learning that the apartment complex had in
fact been transferred, Western Savings offered to allow the
new buyers to assume the appellants'
increased interest rate.

indebtedness at an

(R. 21, 111.)

The new buyers,

however, failed to submit the necessary loan application
forms.

(R. 28.)

Accordingly, because appellants secretivel:

breached their contractual obligations and continued to
violate the terms of their financing agreement, even after
discovery, Western Savings relied on its contractual rights
to accelerate the remaining balance.

When appellants

fail~

to pay the principal due, Western Savings began foreclosure
proceedings.
For more than three and one-half years, appellants
failed to complain to Western Savings or otherwise challenge
Paragraph 29 of the Trust Deed.

Although appellants could

have borrowed money for their investment property from other
lending institutions, and at different terms, they accepted
the terms offered by Western Savings.

Western Savings reliec

on those terms in agreeing to lend money to the appellants.
Appellants, however, on May 19, 1980, after violating the
terms of the loan agreement, filed a col'lplaint seeking: ( l!
declaratory judgment that Western Savings did not have the
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right to enforce the express and clear terms of the Trust
Deed agreement;

(2) an injunction against the acceleration of

the indebtedness and foreclosure proceedings, although both
were part of the agreed terms of the Trust Deed; and (3)
"damages" allegedly resulting from Western Savings' reliance
on the terms of the Trust Deed.

( R.

2-8.)

Arguments based upon the undisputed facts were
heard on July 10, 1980, and the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup
rendered summary judgment in favor of Western Savings:
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The pleadings, affidavits and exhibits before
the court show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that defendant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.
Based upon the above
findings and conclusions and for good cause appearing, it is hereby
ORDERED that plaintiffs' complaint is dismissed with prejudice and all parties are to bear
their own costs. (R. 113.)
By this appeal, appellants seek to avoid the
obligations to which they agreed, simply because those
obligations ceased to be economically beneficial to them.
For the reasons stated herein, the appellants' appeal must be
rejected and the decision of the lower court affirmed.
ARGUMENT
I.

WESTERN SAVINGS HAS THE CONTRACTUAL,
EQUITABLE, AND STATUTORY RIGHT TO
INCREASE THE INTEREST RATE OF THE
TRUST NOTE AS CONSIDERATION FOR ITS
CONSENT TO THE TRANSFER OF THE SUBJECT
PROPERTY AND ITS WAIVER OF THE DUE-ONSALE CLAUSE.

The Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note specifically
authorized Western Savings to accelerate the indebtedness or
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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increase the interest rate of the Trust Note if the
appellants conveyed the property by contract.

The appellant

recognize this and, therefore, now argue that the due-on-sa~
clause of the Trust Deed is an unreasonable restraint on the
alienation of property.
three reasons:

Such an argument is invalid for

( 1) increasing the interest rate to the new

buyer on the remaining indebtedness to more closely reflect
current interest rates, in lieu of accelerating the

origin~

borrower's indebtedness, is not a restraint on alienation;
(2) such a practice is reasonable;
equitable; and

(4)

(3)

such a practice is

the Utah Legislature has authorized

state-chartered savings and loan associations,

such as

Western Savings, to exercise its options under the
due-on-sale clause.
A.

Western Savings' Exercise Of Its Rights Under

The Due-On-Sale Clause Is Not A Restraint On Alienation.
Appellants argue that the due-on-sale clause
constitutes an unreasonable restraint on their ability to
convey their apartment complex.

While they make various

arguments in support of this proposition,
realize why appellants do so.

it is important

~

The simple fact is that, if

the new buyers assume the loan at an increased interest rate
the appellants will receive less money than they prefer to
receive.

Therefore, appellants desire the new buyers to

obtain the benefit of the low (by today's standards) 9-5/8!
interest rate on the existing loan.
A contractual provision in a loan agreement which
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Librarypr~fer
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to

receive for his property but does not restrain the actual
transfer of the property is not a restraint on alienation:
In practical terms [these provisions] merely
[affect] the vendor-mortgagor's total asking price
for his property.
A higher interest rate will
probably cause the vendor-mortgagor to lower his
sales price in order to compete price wise with
similar property . . .
thus the vendor-mortgagor's
ability to command his preferred asking price might
be somewhat impaired.
Nevertheless, the increased
interest provision does not restrain the actual
transfer of the property because there is no
constraint on the vendor-mortgagor's freedom to
alienate his property.
Miller v. Pacific First Federal Savings and Loan Association, 545 P.2d 546, 548-59 (Wash. 1976)

(citations omitted);

see also, Gunther v. White, 489 S.W.2d 529 (Tenn. 1973);
Enforcement of Due-On-Transfer Clauses, 13 Real Property,
Probate and Trust Journal 891

(1978).

Appellants' attempt to characterize a due-on-sale
clause as a "restraint on alienation" tortures that concept
as it has heretofore been understood.

This was recognized in

a recent state court decision interpreting the due-on-sale
clause:
The Restatement of Property§ 404 (1944) defines a
restraint on alienation as follows:
(1) A restraint on alienation, as that phrase is
used in this Restatement, is an attempt by an otherwise
effective conveyance or contract to cause a later conveyance
(a) to be void; or
.
. .
(b) to impose contractual 11ab1l1ty on the one
who makes the later conveyance when such liability
results from a breach of an agreement not to
convey; or
.
( c) to terminate or subJect to termination all
or a part of the property interest conveyed.
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(2) If a restraint on alienation is of the type
described in Subsection (1), Clause (a), it is a
disabling restraint.
( 3)
If a restraint on alienation is of the type
described in Subsection ( 1 ) , Clause ( b), it is a
promissory restraint.
(4) If a restraint on alienation is of the type
described in Subsection ( 1), Clause ( c), it is a
forfeiture restraint.
One need simply read the various subparts of § 40;
to conclude that a "due on sale" clause does not, in a•,
manner, bring about any of the effects noted there a~·
cannot, therefore, be a direct restraint on alienation.
The questioned clause in no manner precludes the
owner-mortgagor from conveying his property.
The owner
is free to convey without legal restraint and the
con1eyance does not cause a forfeiture of the title, bu:
only an acceleration of the debt.
It is true that the possibility of acceleration ma
impede the ability of an owner to sell his property as·
he wishes [the basis of the court's decision in Tucker
v. Larsen, 526 P.2d 1169 (Cal. 1974), a case heavrry-relied upon by appellants); nonetheless, not every
impediment to a sale is a restraint on alienation, let
alone contrary to public policy.
It is a fact that
zoning restrictions, building restrictions, or public
improvements may impede the sale and substantially
affect the ability of an owner to realize a maximum
price.
Yet no one suggests that such restrictions or
convenants, as a class, are invalid simply because the;·
affect the ease with which one may dispose of one's
property. We are somewhat at a loss to understand how
or why so many courts have been willing to describe a
"due on sale" clause as a restraint on alienation and~
are unwilling to do so.
Occidental Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Venco, 293 N.W.2d 843,
845 (Neb. 1980).

(Emphasis added.)

See also,

Enforcemento:

Due-On-Transfer Clauses, supra, at 898, 916, 926.
Requiring the appellants'

new buyers to assume t~

loan at an increased interest rate does not prohibit appellants from transferring their property;

it only lowers the

price appellants will receive for their apartment complex.
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Therefore, this case does not involve a "restraint on alienation."
B.

Enforcement Of The Due-On-Sale Clause Is

Reasonable.
Appellants correctly note that one of the purposes
of the due-on-sale clause is to preserve and protect the
lender's security and avoid having to resort to that security
to obtain payments.

However, that is not the only reason for

the due-on-sale clause.

There are additional purposes for

these provisions which the majority of courts have recognized
as being justified.

Specifically, the due-on-sale clause

permits lending institutions, including Western Savings, to
adjust their loan portfolio toward current market rates and
insure that mortgages and trust notes are saleable on the
secondary mortgage market.

See, Occidental Savings & Loan

Ass'n. v. Venco, 293 N.W.2d at 849; Century Federal Savings &
Loan Ass'n of Bridgeton v.
(N.J.

Van Glahn, 364 A.2d 558, 562

1976).
The necessity, fairness and, therefore, the

reasonableness of the due-on-sale clause have been recognized
by the majority of courts considering this question,
particularly in these times of double-digit inflation and
widely fluctuating interest rates. See, Occidental Savings &
Loan Ass'n v. Venco, 293 N.W.2d 843 (Neb. 1980); Tierce v.
APS Co., 382 So.2d 485 (Ala. 1980); Miller v. Pacific First
Federal savings

&

Loan Ass'n., 545 P.2d 546 (Wash.

1976);

Crockett v. First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n., 224 S.E.2d
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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580 (N.C. 1976); Century Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. V~

----

Glahn, 62 Misc.2d 863, 313 N.Y.S.2d 804 (1970); Malouff v.

Midland Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n., 509 P.2d 1240 (Colo.
1973); Gunther v. White, 489 S.W.2d 529 (Tenn.

-

1973); Mutual

Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Wisconsin Wire Works, 205
N.W.2d 762 (Wis. 1973); Peoples Savings Ass'n v. Standard
Industries, Inc., 257 N.E.2d 406 (Ohio 1970); Stith v. Hudso·
City Savings Institution, 63 Misc.2d 863, 313 N.Y.S.2d 804
( 1970).
1. The due-on-sale clause is necessary to set
fair and reasonable interest rates on mortgages and trust
deed notes.
One important factor that any lender considers
in setting the interest rate of a loan is the period of time
the loan will be outstanding.

Obviously, the longer the tLr·

period, the greater risk the lender assumes that he may

n~

realize a reasonable return on his money because of inflation, catastrophe, the uncredi tworthiness of the borrowers,
etc.

This basic principle is equally applicable to the

gage loan industry.

~r~

Properties subject to mortgages are

sold, on the average, about every ten to twelve years.

See,

U.S. League of Savings Associations, Mortgage Portfolio
Management (1978) at 127.

Therefore, when Western Savings

makes its loans, it knows that, on the average, the interes»
rates on the loans will be updated toward current market
levels within ten to twelve years, even though the loans
themselves are written for a thirty-year period.

Therefore,
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western Savings in effect sets the interest rates on its
loans to account for a ten to twelve-year risk period.
Given the present economic conditions, a judicial
holding that the due-on-sale clause is unenforceable would
effectively lock Western Savings and similar lenders into low
rates of return for thirty years, even though interest rates
initially were set on the assumption that they would be
adjusted upward to current levels at least two or three times
during the 30-year period of the loan.
Appellants contend that raising the interest rates
to meet the projected economic risks of inflation is not a
reasonable purpose of the due-on-sale clause, relying heavily
upon Wellenkamp v. Bank of America, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379, 582
P.2d 970

( 1978).

In that case, the court wrongly assumed

that lenders did not correctly project future economic
conditions, i.e., they did not anticipate the recent high
inflation and interest rates and, therefore, it would be
"unjust to place the burden of the lender's mistaken economic
projections on property owners . • . . "

Id. at 976.

Simply put, the Wellenkamp decision is not supported by the facts of the case, by economic principle or by
logic.

Contrary to the Wel1enkamp decision, lenders made no

errors in projecting future ecJnomic conditions.

The error

they made was in projecting future judicial decisions.
Lenders knew that the interest rates they gave to borrowers
would account for risks incurred over an average ten to
twelve-year period.

What they failed to foresee was that the
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California Supreme Court would hold that the interest rates
set for that ten to twelve-year risk period would have to
compensate lenders for risks incurred over thirty years.

In

short, the California court made an independent,
after-the-fact business judgment about how interest rates
should be set, and this judgment changed the mortgage loan
industry in California.
Obviously, if a lender had known that the interes•
rate on a loan to the appellants could not be increased by
reason of the exercise of the due-on-sale clause, the
lender's economic projections would have been forecast on

t:,,

basis of a thirty-year period rather than a ten or
twelve-year period.

The interest rate the appellants

received thus would have been higher at the outset.

There-

fore, by receiving the interest rate of only 9-5/8%,
appellants already have benefitted from their loan terms.
Further allowing them to lock up that interest rate for up
thirty years after they sell their property to someone

t:

el~,

unfairly permits them to transfer their low interest loan

~

the new buyers and thereby receive an unbargained-for windfall profit at the expense of lenders and all other new
buyers who are not lucky enough to assume existing mortgage
loans.

See generally, Enforcement of Due-On-Transfer

Clauses, supra, at 930.
If lenders are forced tempor ar i 1 y to absorb losses
caused by a judicial decision that they cannot enforce
due-on-sale clauses, they will have to recover from future
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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customers the unrealized anticipated revenues. 1 This will
be necessary in order to cover losses sustained by carrying low interest rate mortgages as well as to cover future
risks which the lender will have to bear beyond the usual ten
to twelve-year period.

The only way additional revenue can

be generated is by charging higher rates to new customers on
conventional mortgages, by instituting variable rate mortgages which reflect current interest rates, by making shortterm loans amortized over shorter periods which would require
all purchasers to refinance their loans more often, or by
ceasing to make new loans and go to the second-mortgage market.

Under any of these alternatives, a borrower's monthly

lsavings and loan associations, including western
Savings, recently have been put into a serious earnings
crunch with the substantial rise in interest rates during the
past two years.
Many will have a net operating loss for
1980.
To attract depositors, they have had to offer
unprecedentedly high rates of interest on their passbook
accounts, certificates of deposit and money market
certificates. Without these deposits, the lending
institutions would be unable to maintain minimum reserves on
which to borrow additional funds which in turn are lent to
prospective home purchasers.
Because savings and loan associations "borrow short and
lend long," they are squeezed during periods of rising
interest rates:
they have to pay extremely high interest on
short-term accounts, by using income from relatively lowinterest long-term loans. This problem arises because the
vast majority of the loans which a lender holds in its
portfolio was made before the steep rise in interest rates.
Consequently, savings and loan associations are forced to pay
high-interest short-term accounts from low-interest long-term
mortgage loans.
The only way these lenders ca~ continue ~o
make loans and meet expenses is to raise the yield of their
loan portfolio.
If they are prevented from raising the rates
on previous loans, e.g., by using the due-on-sale clause,
then they will have to raise rates dramatically on future
loans.
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payments will be higher, thus making it impossible for many
otherwise qualified buyers to purchase property.

See,

Malouff v. Midland Federal Savings and Loan Association,
509 P.2d at 1244-45; Wellenkamp v. Bank of America: A Victor·:
__..
for the Consumer?, 31 Hastings L.J. 275, 293-97

(1979);

'Flexibility in Housing Subsidies, No Variable Mortgages' Garn, The Salt Lake Tribune, November 28,

1980 at B-6.

Lenders Pushing Second Mortgages to Ease Pinch of Long-Term
Loans, The Wall Street Journal, November 4,
contrast to these alternatives,
due-on-sale

~ortgage

198 0 at 3 1 .

In

the reasonableness of the

is apparent.

Under this type of

mortgage, the interest rate is fixed between the lender and
his original borrower.

The original borrower is able to

retain the advantage of his original interest rate for as
long as he has the loan, even though current interest rates
may have risen substantially.

If the original borrower sell'

the property during the life of the loan, the new buyer is
then able to assume the loan at least at the current interes:
rate and probably at a slightly lower rate than the market
rate.

Malouff v. Midland Federal Savings and Loan

Association, 509 P.2d at 1245.
Appellants' brief attempts to demean the beneficia:
aspects of the due-on-sale clause by mischaracterizing
Western Savings' argument before the lower court.

Western

Savings has never argued that an adverse "decision will brine
the mortgage loan industry to its knees" or that "financial
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chaos has fallen upon the states who have rejected (the arguments presented herein.]"

Appellants' Brief at 28.

Lending institutions will continue to make loans to
enable borrowers to purchase homes and investment properties.
They will in fact incur some losses if they are not allowed
to rely upon the due-on-sale clause, but as demonstrated
above the primary adverse impact will be upon borrowers
seeking new loans.

They will be forced to accept one of the

alternatives to conventional mortgages, and they will bear
all the attendant disadvantages.
Appellants rely heavily upon California precedent.
Since Wellenkamp, however, California lenders have found new
ways to alleviate the bind in which that decision placed
them.

They have instituted many of the alternative loans

described above, and the adverse impact on prospective
borrowers has been real. See,

~,

Wellenkamp v. Bank of

America: A Victory for the Consumer?, 31 Hastings L.J. 275
( 1979).

The question before this Court is who will bear the
burden of increased interest rates brought on by inflation?
The appellants seek to shift that burden from existing
borrowers who already have realized inflationary gains in the
value of their property to lending institutions, including
Western Savings, and to those new borrowers who want to
purchase homes but who may be unable to afford the higher
payments resulting from that shift.
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Such a result should not be allowed.

The issue of

who is to bear the burden of increased rates was decided
previously by the appellants themselves when they agreed that
Western Savings could either accelerate their loan if the
apartment complex was conveyed by con tract of sale or
increase the interest rate of that loan if it were to be
assumed.

This resolution of the issue was approved in

Gunther, 489 S.W.2d at 532, when the court stated:
~The lender under its contract had] the right to
insist upon the repayment of their loan in the event of
sale, so that they can re lend the money at an increased
interest rate, and so maintain their supply of lending
money, at the level of the present cost of such money.
In this situation, equity should not depart from the la'•
which requires it to enforce valid contracts and strike
down the acceleration options simply because its
exercise will let the [lenders], not the [borrowers]
make the profit on the interest rate occasioned by the
increased cost of money.

This resolution similarly should be approved by this
Court.
2. The due-on-sale clause is necessary to
obtain adequate secondary mortgage market funding.
Besides having an adverse impact on borrowers
seeking new loans, elimination of the due-on-sale clause
would reduce the number of loans that could be made.

The

amount of mortgage money which Utah savings and loan
associations, including Western Savings, receive from their
depositors is far less than the amount they lend out.

They

are able to lend additional money because of their ability to
sell their financing instruments to investors in the
secondary mortgage market outside the state.
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These secondary mortgage market investors, as did
western Savings, anticipated that mortgage loan interest
rates would be adjusted every ten to twelve years.

If they

do not receive that readjustment through enforcement of the
due-on-sale clause, they either will refuse to purchase Utah
mortgages or else will require a higher rate of interest on
new loans to compensate for the increased risk of holding the
mortgages for longer periods.

Therefore, without enforceable

due-on-sale clauses, to sell trust notes and mortgages on the
secondary market, Utah lenders will be required to charge new
borrowers substantially higher interest rates, thereby
decreasing the number of loans that will be made.
In contrast, the reasonableness of the due-on-sale
loan agreements is apparent, because through their use Utah
lenders are able to obtain funds from the secondary market,
thereby enabling more people to purchase homes at lower
rates.
As demonstrated, infra, appellants fail to address
fairly the adverse economic impacts which will result if this
Court strikes down the due-on-sale clause.
The Federal National Mortgage Association {"Fannie
Mae"), the major purchaser of mortgage loans, announced that
beginning with loans written October 1, 1980, those new
buyers seeking to assume existing loans will be unable to do
so unless they pass a credit check and agree to accept
prevailing market interest rates.

See, Fannie Mae to Require
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Prevailing Rates, Credit Checks on Mortgage Assumptions, T~
wall Street Journal, August 11, 1980, at 25.
In addition, "Fannie Mae" has announced that it 00
longer will buy conventional mortgages from lending in thoH
eleven states which judicially or statutorily have prohibit~
enforcement of due-on-sale provisions.

Instead,

it only will

purchase loans which carry a provision that the entire loan
can be called after seven years, with no guarantee of
refinancing. See, Higher Mortgages,

'Call-In Option' Threate;.

Homebuyers, Industry, The Salt Lake Tribune, Nov. 8,
C-6.

1980 at

This !'!leans that all new home buyers will be faced with

the threat of increased rates and payments in seven years,
whereas if they had conventional mortgages with enforceable
due-on-sale clauses, they would be assured of a fixed month!;·
payment for as long as they owned their homes.
Future borrowers should not be forced to bear the
risks of increased rates or of an inability to finance home
purchases.

These risks can be avoided by allowing lenders,

including Western Savings, to enforce the due-on-sale provisions of loan agreements into which borrowers, including
appellants, freely entered.

c.

Enforcement Of The Due-On-Sale Clause In This

Case Is Equitable.
Not only is the enforcement of the due-on-sale
clause reasonable, as discussed above, but it also is
equitable in this case to allow an upward adjustment of the
interest rate pursuant to the loan agreement.

This is so
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because:

(1) if the interest rate had gone down, appellants

could have refinanced their property at the lower rate;

(2)

under the doctrine of laches, appellants are barred from
challenging the due-on-sale clause, since they waited more
than three and one-half years to object to its provisions;
(3) under the doctrine of "unclean hands," appellants are
barred from challenging the due-on-sale clause because of
their demonstrated bad faith and secretive actions evidenced
by their concealment of the transfer of the property; and (4)
this case involves investment rather than residential
property, as discussed, infra.
If the interest rate had decreased after appellants
took their loan from Western Savings, they could have
refinanced their property pursuant to the Trust Note, and
prepaid the loan from Western Savings, thereby incurring some
prepayment expense.

If appellants had refinanced with

Western Savings, it was its policy not to charge a prepayment
fee.

But if the appellants had gone elsewhere to refinance

their property at lower rates, Western Savings would have
been bound by the terms of the Trust Note and would not have
realized any long-term revenue anticipated in making the
loan.

Now, however, when interest rates have gone up rather

than down, appellants argue they should not be bound by the
terms of their agreement with Western Savings.

In other

words, appellants contend that Western Savings should bear
all the risks.

If interest rates go down, appellants should

be able to refinance at the lower rate; and if interest rates
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go up and if appellants sell their property, Western

Savi~s

should not be able to adjust the loan rate to account for
that increase.

This is an inequitable proposal, particular!;

where, as here, the appellants agreed to and Western Savings
relied on the provisions of the loan documents which allowed
western Savings to either accelerate the loan in the

eve~ ~

sale or else increase the interest rate of the loan to the
new buyer who assumes the loan.
It is crucial to note that appellants for more tha:
three and one-half years did not challenge the due-on-sale
clause.

Appe~lants

neither objected to that provision when

they executed the Trust Deed, Trust Note, and "Acknowledgrnen:
of Trust Deed Acceleration Clauses" nor contested that provision at any time during the following three and one-half
years.

Appellants obviously viewed their loan arrangements

as economically beneficial to them for that period, but now,
because they have sold the property and interest rates are
higher, they are seeking any way possible to avoid their
obligation under the due-on-sale provision.

In

effect,~

are asking this Court for a reformation of the contract.

It

is patently inequitable for them first to obtain and for
three and one-half years receive the benefit of the loan
agreement, which included the due-on-sale provision, and no•,
after selling the property, seek to challenge and evade that
provision.
Not only did appellants wait for such an unconscionably long period before objecting to the due-on-sale
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provision, they were not honest enough to inform Western
Savings of their conveyance of the property.

Instead, they

deliberately concealed the transfer and avoided informing,
confronting or negotiating with Western Savings.

Where the

appellants so obviously are motivated by bad faith and have
engaged in inequitable conduct, they are not entitled to the
relief they seek in this appeal.
Lastly, even the California courts, the decisions
of which are cited extensively in Appellants' Brief, have
held that it is reasonable and equitable to enforce the
due-on-sale clause where the subject property is investment
property.

See, Medovoi v. American Savings and Loan Ass'n.,

89 Cal. App. 3d 875, 152 Cal. Rptr. 572, 587 (1979).
Similarly, because this case involves investment property--a
24-unit apartment complex--the-due-on-sale clause should be
enforced and the decision of the lower court should be
affirmed.
D.

Western Savings Has The Statutory Right To

Enforce The Due-On-Sale Clause.
Federally-chartered savings and loan associations
are governed by federal regulation and are specifically
authorized to enforce due-on-sale clauses:
(f)
Due-on-sale clauses. An association
continues to have the power to include, as a matter
of contract between it and the borrower, a
provision in its loan instrument whereby.the.
association may, at its option, declare i~e~ia~ely
due and payable sums secured by the association s
security instrument if all or any part of the real
property securing the loan is sold or. trans~erred by the
borrower without the association's prior written
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consent. . . .
(E] xercise by the association of such
option (hereafter called a due-on-sale clause) shall ~
exclusively governed by the terms of the loan contract
and all rights and remedies of the association and
'
borrower shall be fixed and governed by that contract.
12 C.F.R. § 545.8-3(f)
The effect of this regulation is to enable
Utah's federally-chartered savings and loan associations to
increase the yield of their mortgage portfolios, consequent],,
permitting them to remain profitable and offer new loans at
the lowest possible rates.
The Utah Legislature has insured that
state-chartered savings and loan associations in Utah shall
be competitive with those which are federally-chartered.
This was accomplished by enactment of Sections 7-7-5.1 and
7-13-74, Utah Code Annotated.
Section 7-7-5.1 provides that "any savings and loar.
association

may make any loan . . . which such

association could make were it incorporated as a federal
savings and loan association . . .
Section 7-13-74 further provides that any statechartered savings and loan association:
shall have, in addition to all rights, powers,
privileges, benefits and immunities presently
possessed, all additional rights, powers,
privileges, benefits and immunities now or hereafter
possessed by federal chartered savings and loan
associations . . . unless and until the
commissioner of the department of financial
institutions of Utah shall, by regulation,
disapprove of any additional right, power,
privilege, benefit or immunity, thus acquired.
The Utah Legislature thus has authorized Utah's
state-chartered savings and loan associations to offer t~
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same kinds of loans as federal associations.

Accordingly,

Utah law authorizes state associations to enforce due-on-sale
provisions such as the one in the agreements between Western
Savings and the appellants.
The Utah Legislature has not "[subordinated] its
regulation of state [associations]

to all present and

future regulations adopted by the federal bureaucracy," as
appellants contend.

(Appellants' Brief at 31.)

On the

contrary, Section 7-13-74 specifically provides that the
Commissioner of the Department of Financial Institutions may,
by regulation, prevent state associations from enforcing the
same provisions that a federal association could enforce.
The Commissioner, however, has not ruled that state-chartered
savings and loan associations may not enforce due-on-sale
clauses.

Therefore, Utah law permits Western Savings to rely

upon and enforce the due-on-sale clause contained in its
agreement with appellants.
II.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY
GRANTED BY THE LOWER COURT.

In response to appellants' complaint, Western
Savings, pursuant to Rule 12(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, filed a motion to dismiss.

Further, pursuant to Rule

12(b), western Savings presented matters outside the complaint, specifically, an affidavit from Sterling Thomas,
Assistant Vice-President of Western Savings, and all the
relevant documents from appellants' loan file.

Accordingly,

the lower court properly treated the motion as one for
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summary judgment under Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil
During the course of the hearing upon the moti~

Procedure.

to dismiss, the lower court considered the complaint, the
motions and memoranda, arguments of counsel and the evidence
consisting of the relevant documents and affidavits.
on the foregoing,

Based

the lower court granted summary judgment ir

favor of Western Savings.
Pursuant to the standards enunciated in Rule 56(c),
the lower court correctly entered summary judgment which th1:
Court should affirm because:
in dispute;

( 1) there are no material facts

( 2 · no material facts were disputed before the

lower court; therefore, appellants are now barred from
contesting the findings of fact; and ( 3) Western Savings was
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
A.

There Are No Material Facts In Dispute;

Therefore, The Lower Court Properly Entered Summary
Judgment.
The relevant, material, undisputed and dispositive
facts in this case are:

(1) In order to finance their investment in a
24-unit apartment complex, appellants borrowed $108,000 from
Western Savings and freely executed the Trust Deed, Trust
Deed Note, and Acknowledgment of Trust Deed Acceleration
Clauses now at issue.
(2)

Paragraph 29 of the Trust Deed required

appellants to notify Western Savings if they transferred an
interest in the property.
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(3)

On or about September 25, 1979, appellants

violated the trust deed by selling their interest in the
property without informing Western Savings.
(4)

Paragraph 29 also provided that if the pro-

perty was sold, Western Savings could accelerate the balance
of the note or, if Western Savings waived that right and
allowed the loan to be assumed, the appellants would have to
agree to an increase in the interest rate of that loan.

The

appellants have refused to comply with this term of the
agreement.
In sum,

the court found that the appellants are

investors, who acknowledged they understood the agreement
they entered, but who nevertheless deliberately breached it
and then attempted to hide their violation from Western
Savings.

Based on these facts, the lower court concluded

that there was no reason in law or equity not to enforce the
agreements reached between Western Savings and the
appellants.
The above-stated material facts are not in dispute
and were not disputed in the lower court; however, in an
effort to avoid the lower court's summary judgment,
appellants now attempt to raise a litany of phantom issues of
disputed material fact.

These so-called issues of fact,

however, are either (a) issues of law, or (b) are not
disputed, or (c) were immaterial to the lower court's
decision.
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Appellants' first purported issue of fact relates
to the interpretation of the due-on-sale clause.

Contrary

~

appellants' assertions, Paragraph 29 of the Trust Deed
specifically grants Western Savings the right to accelerate
the balance of the loan upon transfer of the property or
increase the interest rate of the note if the loan is
assumed. See, page 2, supra.
Further, contrary to appellants' assertions, there
is no contradictory language between the Trust Deed and Trust
Deed Note.

The Trust Deed Note specifically incorporates by

reference the terms of the Trust Deed and provides for the
acceleration of the note for violation of the terms of the
Trust Deed. There is no dispute that the appellants violated
the terms of the Trust Deed and, consequently, Western
Savings, pursuant to the Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note,
properly accelerated the balance of the loan.

Additionally,

this Court previously has held that a note and security
instrument, though separate documents, are not to be construed separately, but together, and that they constitute a
single contract.

An acceleration provision in the Trust Deed

operates upon the note, the same as upon the Trust Deed
itself, and matures the note for all purposes.
Savings

&

Loan Association v. Blomquist, 21

See, American

Utah 2d 289, 293,

445 P.2d 1 (1968).
Contrary to appellants'

first purported issue of

fact, the lower court did examine the contract language.
That language is clear, and granted Western Savings the righ'
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to accelerate the loan after the appellants failed to have
their new buyers assume the loan at a higher interest rate.
Therefore, there was no dispute regarding the language of the
acceleration clause, which in any event is an issue of law
and not of fact.
Appellants' second purported issue of fact relates
to the "fact" that the Trust Deed Note does not specifically
include the acceleration clause.

Again, as previously dis-

cussed, the Trust Deed Note provided that the note would be
accelerated for violation of the terms of the Trust Deed,
thereby incorporating the provisions of the deed into the
note itself; and these two documents must be read together.
This also is an issue of law and not of fact.
Appellants' third purported issue of fact relates
to the circumstances surrounding the appellants' signing of
the documents.

The subjective intent of the parties is

irrelevant unless the language of the contract provisions are
ambiguous.

See generally, Mark Steel Corp. v.

Eimco Corp.,

548 P.2d 892, 894 (Utah 1976); Shattuck v. Precision-Toyota,
Inc., 566 P.2d 1322, 1334 (Ariz. 1977); Johnson v. 0-Kay
Turkeys, Inc., 392 P.2d 741, 743 (Okla. 1964).

Here, the

language of the documents clearly gives Western Savings the
power and authority to enforce the due-on-sale clause.
Moreover, any argument that appellants did not understand
Paragraph 29 would be a sham in light of appellants'
endorsements of the Acknowledgment of Trust Deed Acceleration
Clauses.

Therefore, there is no genuine issue of fact
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regarding the circumstances of appellants' execution of the
documents now at issue.
Appellants' fourth purported issue of fact relates
to the justifications for the due-on-sale clause.
contention is without merit.

Appellan~'

First, these arguments are im-

material to the lower court's decision, which centered upon
the agreements themselves, the appellants' knowledge of thes:
agreements, and the appellants'

inequitable conduct.

Second,

even if the justifications for enforcement of the due-on-sal:
clause were material to the lower court's decision,

the

effects of the elimination of the due-on-sale clause are oot
in dispute.

Following the Wellenkamp decision, California

savings and loan associations instituted variable rate
mortgages and other mortgage alternatives.
perspective of persons seeking new loans,

From the
these alternatives

are inferior to conventional fixed-rate loans because of
their higher rates or shorter durations.
16, supra.

See pages 12 to

Furthermore, as demonstrated by "Fannie Mae's"

latest pronouncements requiring seven-year "call back"
mortgages in those states striking down the due-on-sale
clause, the effects on the secondary market are as real as
the effects in the primary market.
supra.

See, pages 16 to 18,

These facts are not in dispute and have been

recognized by numerous authorities.
Appellants' fifth purported issue of fact is
related to their fourth issue and pertains to the necessity
of adjusting mortgage portfolios toward current rates.
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Again, this issue was not material to the lower court's
decision, which was based upon appellants' inequitable
conduct and their breach of an express agreement.
Additionally, this requirement has been discussed and relied
upon by the authorities cited above, which recognize that
savings and loan associations must raise the yield on their
loan portfolios whenever they are faced with increased costs
of obtaining new money.
Appellants' sixth purported issue of fact is that
no evidence was presented to distinguish residential from
commercial or investment property transactions.

Appellants'

contention is without merit because: (1) they offered no such
evidence and thus are barred from raising that issue on
appeal;

(2) as the lower court noted, appellants are

investors, who understood and deliberately breached their
agreement with Western Savings; and (3) even the California
courts permit enforcement of due-on-sale clauses in cases
involving investment property.

See,

~·

Medovoi v.

American Savings & Loan Ass'n, supra.
Appellants' seventh purported issue of fact is that
no evidence was presented to establish the public policy
considerations involved in the case.
is without merit because:

Appellants' contention

(1) they offered no such evidence

and thus are barred from raising that issue on appeal and (2)
all of the relevant cases briefed and argued to the lower
court continued an analysis of the public policy considerations involved in a judicial decision whether or not to
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permit enforcement of due-on-sale clauses.

Compare,

~.

occidental savings & Loan Ass'n v. Venco Partnership, supra,
and Wellenkamp v. Bank of America, supra.
lower court's Conclusion of Law No.

See also, the

1.

Appellants' eighth purported issue of fact is that
no evidence was presented to determine whether enforcement o'
a due-on-sale clause constitutes an unreasonable restraint o:
alienation.

This contention is without merit because the

matter is an issue of law which was briefed and argued to fo
lower court.

(Con cl us ion of Law No.

1. )

Appellants' ninth purported issue of fact is that
no evidence was presented to establish that Western Savings'
enforcement of the due-on-sale clause does not work a penalt
or forfeiture.

This contention is without merit because: 11

the appellants presented no evidence to the contrary and 12:
the matter is an issue of law.
See,

~,

(Conclusion of Law No. 2.)

Miller v. Pacific First Federal Savings & Loan

Ass'n, 545 P.2d at 549.
Appellants' tenth purported issue of fact is that
no determination was made whether a foreclosure pursuant to'
due-on-sale clause should be treated as a mortgage
foreclosure.

Obviously, this matter is an issue of law

a~

is wholly immaterial to the lower court's conclusion that
"Under the above facts of this case, the 'due on sale'

cla~

before the court is a legal, valid, and enforceable contrac:
provision.

(Conclusion of Law No. 2.)
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Appellants' eleventh purported issue of fact is
that no determination was made about the effect of
due-on-sale clauses upon economic considerations involved in
property transactions.

Appellants' contention is without

merit because: (1) they offered no such evidence and thus are
barred from raising that issue on appeal and (2) the issue is
immaterial to the lower court's decision herein.
Appellants' twelfth purported issue of fact is that
no evidence was presented to establish the effect upon
lenders if due-on-sale clauses are ruled unenforceable.
Appellants' contention is without merit because: (1) Western
Savings by affidavit established the adverse effects upon
lenders; (2) appellants failed to rebut this evidence; and
(3) as demonstrated, supra, at pages 11 to 14, such adverse
effects upon lenders are well recognized.
Appellants' thirteenth purported issue of fact is
that no finding was made whether a due-on-sale clause is an
appropriate way to control interest rates.

Appellants'

contention is without merit because: (1) they offered no such
evidence nor requested such a finding and thus are barred
from raising that issue on appeal and (2) the issue is
immaterial to the lower court's decision herein.
Appellants' fourteenth purported issue of fact is
that the lower court failed to state or clarify the
applicability of Sections 7-7-5.1 and 7-13-74, Utah Code
Annotated.

Appellants' contention is without merit because:

!l) this matter is an issue of law and (2) appellants never
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requested the lower court to make such a statement or
clarification in its conclusions of law.
B.

The Appellants' Purported Issues Of Material.

Fact Were Not Disputed In The Lower Court; Therefore
Appellants Are Barred From Raising Such Issues On Appeal.
Appellants made no attempt in the lower court to
raise any issue of disputed material fact as they should

ha~

done pursuant to Rule 56, if they were to avoid summary
judgment.
Western Savings provided the relevant loan documents and the affidavit of Sterling Thomas in order to
establish the undisputed facts justifying enforcement of the
due-on-sale clause in this case.

Accordingly, Western

Savings' motion to dismiss was treated as a motion for
summary judgment pursuant to the provisions of Rule 56.

Rule

56(e) provides:
When a motion for summary judgment is made and
supported as provided in this Rule, an adverse
party may not rest upon the mere allegations or
denials of his pleading, but his response, by
affidavits or as otherwise provided in this Rule,
must set forth specific facts showing that there is
a genuine issue for trial.
If he does not so
respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be
entered against him.
The appellants offered no evidence to raise any
issue of material fact before the lower court; none of their
affidavits or exhibits were offered to contest nor did they
contest facts established by Western Savings.

Furthermore,

appellants did not even submit an affidavit pursuant to Rule
56 ( f) explaining why they could not obtain facts to dispute
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western Savings' evidence.

Obviously, they failed to do so

because the relevant, material and dispositive facts are not
in dispute, i.e., they knowingly entered into an express
agreement and three and one-half years later breached that
agreement and deliberately tried to conceal that conduct from
western Savings.
Because the appellants failed to demonstrate that
there was any issue of disputed material fact before the
lower court, that court properly entered surrunary judgment and
its decision should be affirmed.
C.

Western Savings Was Entitled To Judgment As A

Matter Of Law.
Based on the undisputed facts and substantial
authority,

the lower court properly held Western Savings was

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Under the facts of

this case, as the lower court concluded, the due-on-sale
clause is not a restraint on alienation.

Its elimination

would create the burden of even higher interest rates for
those who seek new loans in the future.
due-on-sale

Enforcement of the

clause provides the greatest amount of loan

money at the lowest possible rate.

The Utah Legislature has

authorized state-chartered savings and loan associations to
enforce due-on-sale clauses.

Such enforcement in this case

is proper because of the appellants' acknowledgement of the
acceleration clause, because of their inequitable conduct and
because this case involves investment rather than residential
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property.

Based on the foregoing,

the decision of the lower

court should be affirmed.
III.

WESTERN SAVINGS HAS THE CONTRACTUAL AND
STATUTORY RIGHT TO FORECLOSE THE PROPERTY
PURSUANT TO THE TERMS OF THE TRUST DEED.

As a "last resort" argument, appellants contend
that if Western Savings is allowed to foreclose the

proper~

pursuant to the terms of the Trust Deed, the redemption
period should be six months rather than three months.
{Appellants' Brief at 33-35.)

This argument is without

merit.
Paragraphs 21 and 22 of the Trust Deed specificall;·
grant Western Savings the right,

upon appellants' default on

any agreement in the Trust Deed, to accelerate the remaining
balance and cause the trustee to execute a written notice of
default and sell the property, pursuant to the laws of Utah,
to satisfy outstanding obligations.
Section 57-1-23, Utah Code Annotated, authorizes
the trustee to sell the subject property for breach of an
obligation under the Trust Deed:
A power of sale is hereby conferred upon the
trustee which the trustee may exercise and under
which the trust property may be sold in the manner
hereinafter provided, after a breach of an
obligation for which the trust property is conveyed
as security. . •
(Emphasis added.)
Pursuant to Section 57-1-31, Utah Code
Annotated, appellants have three months to prevent the
foreclosure sale by curing the default which necessitated
such action:
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Whenever all . . • of the principal sum of any
obligation secured by a trust deed has . . • been
declared due by reason of a breach or default in
the performance of any obligation secured by the
trust deed . . • at any time within three months of
the filing for record of notice of default under
such trust deed, if the power of sale is to be
exercised . • . [the truster] may pay the beneficiary
the entire amount then due under the terms of such
trust deed and the obligation and trust shall be
reinstated . . . as if no such acceleration had
occurred. (Emphasis added.)
Appellants have several possible courses of
action, and are not limited, as they argue in their brief, to
paying the entire balance within three months, although that
is one option.

A second option is for them to rescind their

sale of the property, and pay all costs and fees, thereby
curing the default caused by the sale of the property.

A

third option is for them to pay all costs and fees and do
that which Western Savings has always sought to have them
do--have the new buyers assume the loan at the increased
interest rate available at the time of the transfer of the
property.
Therefore, although a foreclosure sale of the
property could take place pursuant to Utah law in the event
this Court affirms the trial court's decision, appellants

have several other options available to them to avoid that
result.
CONCLUSION
The fact that appellants will not receive as much
for their investment property as they would prefer, is not
good reason to strike down the due-on-sale clause.

On the
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contrary, enforcement of that clause:

(1) does not work an

unreasonable restraint upon al iena ti on;
(3) is equitable; and

( 2)

is reasonable;

(4) is authorized pursuant to Utah

law.
Based on the foregoing,

the lower court properly

entered summary judgment, and its judgment should be
affirmed.
DATED this

~ay

of December, 1980.
Respectfully submitted,
Richard W. Giauque
James R. Holbrook
Stephen T. Hard
Giauque, Holbrook, Bendinger
& Gurrnankin
500 Kearns Building

Salt

4~;1'!.l~Oe..•1--

::torney' ~
Defendant-Respondent
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